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One of my favorite game theory topics is matching markets. Matching markets are the markets in which both sides of the market have preferences.\u00a0 <\/span>Examples of these markets include college admissions., job searches, and dating. I love the intersection of dating and economics because I think it is a cool easily accessible front for which to understand some Econ concepts. This paper, which is targeted towards an audience with a pretty solid economic background walks through some of the applications of Gale Shapley and Adachi model to talk about how this market functions. They then break down some of the preferences in groups surrounding dating and eventually try to make predictions about marriage. This was a great article if you have the time. Big bonus Dan Ariely is one of the authors who wrote predictably irrational which is covered in Garret\u2019s behavioral class and Kate\u2019s online of economic dating class.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n https:\/\/dukespace.lib.duke.edu\/dspace\/bitstream\/handle\/10161\/3331\/276580100005.pdf<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" One of my favorite game theory topics is matching markets. Matching markets are the markets in which both sides of the market have preferences.\u00a0 Examples of these markets include college admissions., job searches, and dating. I love the intersection of dating and economics because I think it is a cool easily accessible front for which to understand some Econ concepts. This paper, which is targeted towards an audience with a pretty solid economic background walks through some of the applications of Gale Shapley and Adachi model to talk about how this market functions. They then break down some of Continue reading Matching Sorting Dating Oh My!\u00a0<\/span>